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Takeover deterrents and Cross Partial Ownership: the case 






We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross 
Partial Ownership (CPO). Before merger, CPO reduces the profitability of involved 
firms, confirming the “outsider effect". However, the impact of CPO upon merger 
profitability is two-sided in a Cournot setting. CPO, by co-integrating profits, 
increase output collusion leading to anti-competitive effects with facilitated mergers 
in most cases. Nonetheless, a protective threshold exists for which CPO 
arrangements can reduce the incentives for hostile takeovers. This has potentially 
significant regulatory implications. An illustrative example showcases the potential 
relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across different industries. 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of takeovers incentives is generally associated with the “outsider 
effect” of mergers (Salant et al, 1993). In a Cournot-organized industry, the 
benefits of staying outside of a merger outweigh the gains of triggering a 
2 
 
takeover. Others have confirmed this effect by deriving negative incentives to 
merge (Inderst and Wey, 2004; Willig, 1991). In the UK, this effect has been 
empirically demonstrated by measuring the financial performance of firms 
following acquisitions (Dickerson et al., 1997). Partial ownership itself shows 
anti-competitive effects similar to those of mergers such as output reduction, 
profit increase and welfare losses (Reitman, 1994; Reynolds and Snapp, 1986). 
Yet, the “outsider effect” promoted by Salant et al. (1983) has not been 
confirmed in a Cournot oligopoly with CPO. When associated with partial 
ownership mergers and takeovers mostly rely on toeholds in the literature (see 
e.g. Betton et al., 2009; Choi, 1991). In this case, initial equity participation 
facilitates a complete acquisition because it raises the cost of being outbid by a 
competitor (Bulow et al., 1999). The strategy of acquiring a toehold raises 
antitrust issues, as it is detrimental for consumers. However, it is not accounted 
for by regulation agencies (Jovanovic and Wey, 2014). Jovanovic and Wey 
(2014) study the impact of an acquisition (with synergies) on the consumer 
surplus when preceded by an initial ownership and show a post-merger 
improvement. Our article completes this literature by presenting a model where 
the target of a takeover can be a firm engaged in a cross partial ownership with 
another firm, different from the acquirer. Our results (with no synergies 
involved) demonstrate a disincentivising effect of CPO as a takeover deterrent 
leading to a more competitive industry than in a traditional Cournot oligopoly. 
CPO arrangements are common between horizontally competing firms on 
both side of the Atlantic. Examples include Multi System Operators (MSOs) in 
the US such as Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), Turner Broadcasting Systems 
(TBS) and Time-Warner (see Table 1). In Europe, examples include BNP Paribas 
with UAP (AXA) in France and the multiple interlocks between Dresdner Bank, 
Allianz and Munich Re in Germany (see Table 2). More recently, in December 
2017, Spotify and Tencent Music announced plans for a suggested 10% 
participation in each other. This alliance could be seen both as a way to raise 
Spotify’s market value, ahead of an anticipated Initial Public Offering in 2018, 
and as a way of protecting against hostile takeovers. 
 




[Insert Table 2 near here] 
 
In a homogeneous Cournot industry, we are able to determine the profitability of 
a takeover as a function of the endogenous parameters (CPO and the number of 
firms). We explore the implications of CPO for takeover profitability. We 
introduce the concept of partial ownership as a defence against hostile takeover 
by allowing two cases (see Definition 2, in Section 3) with two different takeover 
targets. Exploring asymmetric CPOs allows us to obtain competitive results on 
takeover incentives that are markedly different to the traditional model of 
mergers within a Cournot oligopoly (Tirole, 1988). Prior to the merger, we 
confirm the “outsider effect” of CPO. Then, we show that CPO increases the 
incentives for takeovers in most cases making them profitable for insiders 
because of increased collusion of CPO. This result complements the findings of 
Charlety et al. (2009) in the context of Cournot models with endogenous 
acquisition of capital. However, in the protected case, CPO arrangements can be 
constructed to reduce the incentives to raid the protected firm. Firstly, we 
demonstrate that a protection in asymmetric CPO reduces the incentives to merge 
relative to a benchmark industry without CPO. Secondly, we obtain the minimum 
value of CPO for which a merger on a protected firm is not profitable though this 
depends upon the value of the other CPO. These results highlight a unique 
competitive effect of CPO by making the target less desirable by reducing the 
overall profitability of the merger. This protective CPO threshold can be defined 
in terms of the number of firms in the industry (an endogenous parameter of the 
model) and represents an important finding in this study. This result allows us to 
confirm that practical takeover deterrent policies with CPO (noyaux-durs, 
Deutschland AG) are valid. CPO may thus have regulatory implications for 
competition policy as they improve social welfare. In addition, governments 
willing to protect strategic sectors from hostile takeovers could use a defence in 
participations. Indeed, the use of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers has 
been implemented both in Europe (the different types of “golden shares”) and in 
the US (see e.g. Goldstein, 1996; Lantenois, 2011; Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998). 
The layout of this article is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
partial ownership. Section 3 outlines the model used. Section 4 highlights the key 
analytical results obtained. Section 5 discusses an illustrative example, which 
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allows comparison of the theoretical protective threshold to real-world CPO 
arrangements. The results of our model can hence be shown to have empirical 
relevance for real-world CPO arrangements. Section 6 concludes and discusses 
the opportunities for further work. A mathematical appendix is included at the 
end of this article. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Partial ownership 
Partial Ownership (PO) consists in a firm acquiring a fraction of equity capital of 
a rival at the horizontal level or of a supplier/manufacturer in a vertical 
relationship. The capital in participations does not generally give the majority of 
voting rights and in this case is a non-controlling operation or silent participation 
(Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; Reitman, 1994). Thresholds or ceilings in 
participations exist (usually at the 5%, 10%, 20% and 30% levels) and listed 
companies have to notify regulatory agencies when they cross these levels. The 
importance of partial ownership is threefold. Firstly, the impact of partial 
ownership on competition is much studied and is very important for antitrust 
regulation agencies. As for mergers (see e.g. Compte et al., 2002; Jullien and 
Rey, 2007) the collusive aspect of partial ownership causes a trade-off between 
firms’ efficiency (profits) and reduced consumer surplus. Secondly, as for 
mergers more generally, the study of incentives to engage in PO is also 
important. Similarly, we anticipate an “outsider effect” (Salant et al., 1983) when 
partial ownerships do not involve any synergies. Thirdly, the link between 
participations and technological investment is also significant (see e.g Barcena-
Ruiz and Olaizola, 2007; Minetti et al., 2015). 
The impact of PO on competition and market structure is substantial. 
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) show that PO reduces output and increases prices in 
a Cournot model with barriers to entry. Even when the amount of PO is small, 
this result has anticompetitive effects similar to those of mergers (O’Brien and 
Salop, 2000). Gilo et al. (2006) consider the case of cross participations in a 
dynamic Bertrand model and conclude that tacit collusion can be sustained in the 
long run. In the case of vertically-related industries, Jullien and Rey (2007) study 
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the impact of the resale price maintenance contract on collusion. Vertical contract 
models are empirically tested by Bonnet and Dubois (2010). The issue of 
reinforced market power also applies after the privatization of historically public 
companies and the subsequent liberalization of the market (see e.g. Amundsen 
and Bergman, 2002; Lee and Hwang, 2003). In an application to the US and 
Japanese automobile industries Alley (1997) derives empirical results confirming 
the collusive effects of PO. In contrast, Malueg (1992) finds that in a dynamic 
Cournot framework repeated interactions between competitors can produce less 
collusion. Further, other authors study competitive aspects of participations either 
in a vertical supplier-dealer relationship or in a mixed framework (see e.g. 
Greenlee and Raskovich, 2006; Serbera, 2010). Our article extends the study of 
the competitive role of PO by introducing asymmetric CPOs and leads to 
modified results depending on whether or not CPOs are used to prevent further 
concentration (takeovers). 
 
2.2. Mergers and partial ownership 
Allied to the above the explicit comparison of partial ownership and mergers is 
also of interest. The literature on toehold acquisitions is significant. Acquiring 
participations prior to a merger can be effective as it raises the cost of rival bids 
(see e.g. Bulow et al., 1999; Choi, 1991). However, Betton et al. (2009) explain 
the recent decline in the number of toehold arrangements by the need to acquire a 
sufficient amount of shares for the deal to be completed. Similarly, Jovanovic 
and Wey (2014) find that the acquisition of equity participations into the capital 
of a firm facilitates a later takeover – ultimately reinforcing market power. In the 
US railroad industry Reiffen (1998) empirically tests the validity of a foreclosure 
strategy using partial ownerships. Results are that, contrary to mergers, vertical 
PO align both firms’ interests and do not lead to a potentially anti-competitive 
foreclosure. Fatica (2010) studies the effects of POs prior to foreign direct 
investments. It is shown that toeholds can facilitate full acquisition over a 
greenfield investment though the result depends on the value of investment costs. 
Foros et al. (2011) investigate the effect of controlling participations on the pay-
tv industry in Scandinavia and find that the anti-competitive effects are 
potentially greater than for full mergers. 
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Complex arrangements in cross participations are a practical reality and exist 
in various different forms worldwide. They have been much studied in the 
literature. Cases include horizontal and vertical PO in the Cable TV industry in 
the US (Besen et al., 1999), “Keiretsu” in Japan (Brown and Fung, 2009), 
“Deutschland AG” in Germany (Lantenois, 2011), “noyaux-durs” in France 
(Goldstein, 1996), and “golden shares” in the United Kingdom (Yergin and 
Stanislaw, 1998). The study of these reciprocal participations can be compared 
with the effect of toeholds on takeovers (see e.g. Charlety et al., 2009). However, 
in this paper, the focus is on external takeovers incentives from outside 
companies. This article considers CPO as “golden shares” used as protection to 
guard against foreign hostile takeovers. See Sections 3-4. 
Defensive strategies against hostile buyouts are of great importance. 
Numerous defensive strategies (also known as shark repellents such as “Pac-
Man”, “Nancy Reagan”, “greenmail”, or “white knight”) against hostile buyouts 
have been devised and implemented (see e.g. Barry and Hatfield, 2012). Most of 
these takeover defences do not directly modify the capital structure of the target. 
However, in the context of buy-outs, the question of capital appears to be crucial. 
This motivates our study of the use of CPO to deter hostile takeovers (see e.g. 
Serbera, 2017). We highlight the defensive role of cross participations against 
hostile takeovers useful to protect national interest in strategic sectors. In 
addition, we demonstrate that bilateral partial ownerships have a competitive 
impact as they may limit further market concentration. This important innovation 
brings our model closer into line with financial reality and may also have 
significant regulatory implications. Serbera (2017) discusses three decisions of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) related to the use CPO by governments to 
block foreign investment in strategic sectors. The ruling of the ECJ against these 
protective polices based on free market "laissez-faire" arguments is thus 
criticized because CPOs may prove socially more beneficial than traditional 
competition frameworks. 
 




Our analysis uses the traditional model of a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous 
goods that has n ≥ 1 firms f1, f2,. , fn ∈ F , n ∈ N (Tirole, 1988). Assuming a quadratic 
utility function for the consumption qi of firm fi with associated price pi the 
homogeneous substitutability condition gives pi(q) = a−∑ 𝑞𝑘 k.Whilst an obvious 
simplification the homogeneous substitutability condition seems to have 
empirical relevance to applications spanning the oil, automobile and finance 
industries. See Section 5. Set up in this way this model arises as an important 
special case of the classical model in Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Finally, firms’ 
marginal costs satisfy ci = c. 
Definition 1 A cross partial ownership is a mutual agreement in which two firms 
acquire cross equity participations in each other’s capital structure. 
(i) Cross partial ownership are silent participations (Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; 
Reitman, 1994), giving the acquirer no right in the other firm management 
decisions. 




Let βi,j ∈ [0, 0.5) denote the capital of firm fj held by firm fi. Two firms f1 and f2 
say are in a cross partial ownership agreement if β1,2 > 0 and β2,1 > 0. We write 
f1, f2 ∈ CPO. The special case βi,j = βj,i = 0 represents a benchmark case and 
reduces to the traditional model of a Cournot oligopoly without CPO (Tirole, 
1988). 
Profits for the two protected firms f1, f2 ∈ CPO are given by Πi = (1−βj,i)πi + 
βi,jπj, where πi = [pi(q) − c]qi, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The operating profit of an unprotected firm 
without equity participations and representative of the majority of the industry is 
denoted by πr = [pr(q) − c]qr, r ≥ 3. The merger profit of a non-protected firm is 
given by ΠM = 2πr. The takeover profits on a protected firm are given by Π
'
M = πr 
+ Πi. 
Definition 2 The type of ownership depends on if: 
(i) The target is a firm with no CPO arrangement in which case it is an unprotected 
takeover. 
                                           
1
 The transfer price is thus independent of produced quantities and offset with each other when 
CPO are equal as in the “golden shares” framework. 
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(ii) The target is a firm with a CPO arrangement in which case it is a protected 
takeover. 
 
We have two cases: pre-takeover and post-takeover. In the pre-takeover case 
there are 𝑛 firms and equilibrium values are denoted n. In the post-takeover case 
there are 𝑛 − 1 firms and we observe two possibilities: a takeover of an 
unprotected firm (denoted 
n−1
) and a takeover of a protected firm (denoted 
n−1,p
). 
Benchmark values are denoted 
b
. An illustration of the organisation of the 
industry is shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
Pre-takeover. The n−2 firms with no CPO arrangements choose to maximise their 
individual profit over qr : 
𝜋𝑟  =  max𝑞𝑟{(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐)𝑞𝑟𝑘 } ; 𝑞𝑟 =
𝑎−𝑐−∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘≠𝑟
2
                   (1) 
For the two protected firms f1, f2 ∈ CPO with i, j ∈ {1, 2} we have that 
𝜋𝑖  =  max
𝑞𝑖
{(1 − 𝛽𝑗,𝑖)[𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐]𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗[𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐]𝑞𝑗
𝑘𝑘
}.  
This can be solved to give the first-order conditions 
∂Π1
∂q1
= −2𝑞1(1 − 𝛽2,1) + (1 − 𝛽2,1)(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐) −
𝑘≠1
𝛽1,2𝑞2 = 0 




= −2𝑞2(1 − 𝛽1,2) + (1 − 𝛽1,2)(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐) −
𝑘≠2
𝛽2,1𝑞1 = 0 
𝑞2(2 − 2𝛽1,2) + 𝑞1(1 + 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2) = (1 − 𝛽1,2)(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘∉{1,2} − 𝑐),      (3) 
because ∑ 𝑞𝑘 =𝑘≠1 ∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘∉{1,2} + 𝑞2 and ∑ 𝑞𝑘 =𝑘≠2 ∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘∉{1,2} + 𝑞1. 
 
Takeover of an unprotected firm. The 𝑛 − 4 firms with no CPO arrangement and outside 
of the merger choose to maximise πr as per equation (1). The two protected firms 
f1, f2 ∈ CPO maximise the partially joint profits Πi, i = 1, 2 given in (2-3). The two 




Π𝑀  =  max
𝑞3,𝑞4










Takeover of a protected firm. The n − 3 firms with no CPO arrangement and out of 
the merger choose to maximise πr as per equation (1). The protected firm f1 is the 
target of a takeover by a firm f3, say. The protected firm outside of the merger, f2 say, 
maximises the joint profit shown in equation (3). Here, it is convenient to re-write 
this equation as 
𝑞2(2 − 2𝛽1,2) + 𝑞1(1 + 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2) + 𝑞3(1 − 𝛽1,2) = (1 − 𝛽1,2)(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘>3 ).  (4) 




′ = (1 −  𝛽2,1)[𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐]𝑞1 +  𝛽1,2[𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐]𝑞2 + [𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐]𝑞3
𝑘𝑘𝑘
, 








+ (1 −  𝛽
2,1
)(𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞
𝑘




























𝑞1(2 − 𝛽2,1) + 𝑞2(1 + 𝛽1,2) + 2𝑞3 = 𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐                  𝑘>3 (6) 
because ∑ 𝑞𝑘 =𝑘≠1 ∑ 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑞2 + 𝑞3𝑘>3  and ∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘≠3 = ∑ 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑞1 + 𝑞2.𝑘>3  
 
4. Analytical results 
In this section, we establish the results of cross partial ownership both before and 
after the takeover. Table 3 summarises how the equilibrium profits depend upon 
the type of ownership. 
 




As a corollary to the equilibrium values shown in Table 3, we obtain the 
following propositions. Proposition 1 confirms the “outsider effect” as the firms 
inside the CPO arrangement are worse off than the firms outside (Salant et al., 
1983). As with full mergers CPO reinforces the concentration in the industry 
leading to an increase of market power and a strategic output’s reduction in the 
oligopoly. Proposition 2 brings novelty to the analysis of mergers by offering 
conditions for a merger to be profitable for the insiders.  
 
Proposition 1 (The outsider effect.) The impact of CPO upon profit margins is as 
follows: 
(i) The CPO increases the profits of the wider industry outside the CPO. 
(ii) The CPO reduces the combined profits of the firms inside the CPO. 
 
Proof 
(i) From Table 3 𝜋𝑟
𝑛 is an increasing function of β1,2 and β2,1. 
(ii) The combined profit of Firms 1-2 is 
2−𝛽1,2−𝛽2,1
(𝑛+1−𝛽1,2−𝛽2,1)
2 which is a decreasing 
function of β1,2 and β2,1, because it is assumed we have n ≥ 3 firms. 
∎ 
In the following proposition, we obtain the results for profitability of mergers 
within the setting of CPO. This result adds to the debate on the outsider effect of 
mergers (see e.g. Charlety and Souam, 2002) by allowing profitable mergers for 
insiders in the case of symmetric costs in Cournot models. In our set-up, the 
presence of CPO increases tacit collusion of firms. In the event of a merger, CPO 
helps by reducing the strategic reaction of rival firms to increase output, 
following the increase in price, thus making a merger profitable for insiders.  
 
Proposition 2 (Profitability of mergers) 
Mergers are profitable under the following conditions 







 .                                                (7) 



















 .                                      (8) 
Proof. 
We need to show that the profit for the merged firm is greater than the two firms 
in isolation, i.e. bnr
n
M







n  , 
1)(2 1,22,1  nn  , 
22
1,22,1 )1()(2  nn  and the result follows. In the 
protected case, multiplying (8) by n+1 gives nn 2)(2)1(1 1,22,11,2   , 
)(21)1( 1,22,11,2   nn , 
2
1,22,11,2
2 )(2)1()1(   nn . 
∎ 
In the sequel, we address the issue of hostile takeovers. The excess profit from a 




𝑛 .                                                                      (9) 









.                                            (10) 













.             (11) 
 
It is easy to show that the return shown in equation (11) is decreasing in 𝛽2,1 but 
increasing in 𝛽1,2. In principle high values of 𝛽1,2 may mean that the return in 
equation (11) may exceed the benchmark return shown in equation (10). 
However, Proposition 3 lays out conditions under which the CPO adds protection 
irrespective of the fraction 𝛽1,2 of the company owned by a second party. 
Proposition 3 shows that in an industry with CPO the incentives for a hostile 
takeover are reduced relative to a benchmark industry. 
 








,                                                          (12) 
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If equation (12) holds then 
𝛽2,1 − 1 >
2𝑛2 − 1 − 𝑛4
𝑛4
; 1 − 𝛽2,1 <
𝑛4 − 2𝑛2 + 1
𝑛4
 
The return shown in equation (11) is then bounded above by 








i.e. the benchmark return shown in equation (10). 
∎ 
Definition 3 An asymmetric CPO 2,1 and 1,2 is said to be completely effective 
against hostile takeovers iff the return given in equation (8) is less than or equal 
to one. 
 
Definition 3 thus enables us to pinpoint precisely when a CPO can protect 
against hostile takeovers be reducing the profit levels that can be achieved by the 
raiding firm. These conditions are laid out in Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4 (Protective CPO threshold) 
If an asymmetric CPO 2,1 and 1,2 is completely effective against hostile 
takeovers then 
𝛽1,2 < 𝑛 + 1 − 𝛽2,1 −
(1 + √1 − 𝛽2,1)
𝛽2,1
, 
subject to the constraint  
0 ≤ 𝑛 + 1 − 𝛽2,1 −








Suppose that the return in equation (11) is equal to one. In this case, it follows 
that 
(1 − 𝛽2,1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑧)
2 = (𝑛 − 𝑧)2, 
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where 1,22,1  z . This leads to the following quadratic in zn  : 
0)1())(1(2)( 1,21,2
2





















5. Illustrative example 
 
In this section, we compare the prediction given in Proposition 3 by (12) with 
empirical data on the “Deutschland AG” and “noyaux-durs” policies much 
discussed in the academic literature (Goldstein, 1996; Franks and Mayer, 1998; 
Lantenois, 2011; Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998). See Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
 
Based on available data from the Bloomberg database results constructed in 
Table 4 correspond to taking n = 6 large financial companies in Germany and n = 
10 large French conglomerates across the oil, automobile and finance industries. 
Results shown in Table 4 demonstrate that the threshold given in equation (12) 
offers a very reasonable prediction of real-world CPO arrangements given 
different industry sizes and the simplicity of the model. However, there is some 
suggestion of varying levels of protection for firms in either industry. For 
example, Munich Re and BNP do not meet the minimal requirement for a CPO to 
be effective in deterring hostile takeover. However, our illustrative example 
allows theoretical validation of the takeover deterrents in CPO implemented by 
European firms during the golden share era. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
This article explores the theoretical study of the impact of CPO in the context of mergers. 
A mixture of theoretical work (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O’Brien and Salop, 2000) and 
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applied work (see e.g. Perotti, 1992; Reiffen, 1998) investigate participations but does 
not explicitly link them with takeover incentives. Our contribution is also timely and 
relevant. Numerous articles highlight the role and functioning of different forms of 
“golden shares” across several countries. Examples include O’Brien and Salop (2000) in 
the US, Brown and Fung (2009) on Keiretsu, Lantenois (2011) on “Deutschland AG”, 
Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) on UK “golden shares”, and Goldstein (1996) for French 
“noyaux-durs”. In addition, Jovanovic and Wey (2014) study the role of CPO when 
takeovers offer synergies. 
In this article, we study takeover incentives in a Cournot oligopoly model with 
two firms linked by cross participations. The use of CPO can increase market 
concentration by offering incentives for firms to takeover rivals, therefore offsetting 
the “outsider effect” confirmed in the case of CPOs. However, asymmetric CPO can 
also serve as an effective defence against hostile takeovers by making the target less 
attractive. The implications for competition policy are compelling. This competitive 
aspect is highlighted by a comparison of takeover incentives between two industries – 
one with CPO and one benchmark industry without such participations. Higher 
levels of protection may also be possible if the level of CPO is greater than the 
threshold shown in equation (12). Because the full integration of a rival’s profits 
(buyout) is more harmful in terms of competition than partial ownerships 
authorizing CPO could thus prove socially beneficial. 
This article sheds new light on the analysis of competition and market power. 
It also raises questions in the case of an “attack” and thus gives ample scope for 
additional investigations. Results shown in Section 5 also show that our model may 
have some empirical relevance across a diverse range of industries. Future work will 
examine the consequences of cross participations on protected firms’ incentives to 
raid competitors. This protection could be used in this case to “attack” competitors. 
This could prove decisive in the analysis of the influence of CPO on market 
concentration and on economic welfare. Other types of demand function with non-
homogeneous goods could allow for further extensions of the model to other settings 
e.g. Bertrand competition. A comparative statics analysis will explore the role of 
other parameters (number of firms, marginal costs) on market power in our model. 
Further studies of equity strategies, against or in support of a buyout, may have 
important implications both for policy makers in charge of the current regulatory 





Derivation of equilibrium values 
(i) Summing (1) over the 𝑛 − 2 firms outside the CPO gives 
2 ∑ 𝑞𝑘 = (𝑛 − 2)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (𝑛 − 3)𝑘∉{1,2} ∑ 𝑞𝑘 − (𝑛 − 2)(𝑞1 +𝑘∉{1,2} 𝑞2).       (13) 




(𝑎 − 𝑐).                                                        𝑘 (14) 













 ,                                               (15) 
πr
n = [a − ∑ qk − c]k qr =
(a−c)2
(n+1−β2,1−β1,2)
2.                                                (16) 
It follows from equations (14-15) that 
𝑞1 + 𝑞2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑞𝑟 =
(𝑛−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2)(𝑎−𝑐)
𝑛+1−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2
; 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 =  
(𝑛−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2)(𝑎−𝑐)
𝑛+1−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2
.         (17)  
Combining (14) and equations (2-3) it follows that 
𝑞𝑖 =  
(𝑛 − 𝛽𝑗,𝑖)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
𝑛 + 1 − 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2
; Π𝑖
𝑛 =  
(1 − 𝛽𝑗,𝑖)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2
(𝑛 + 1 − 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2)
2
. 
(ii) Because in this case the  𝑛 − 3 firms outside of the CPO solve the optimisation 
problem shown in equation (1) this reduces to Case (i) discussed above with 𝑛 
replaced by 𝑛 − 1. 
(iii) Summing (1) over the 𝑛 − 3 firms outside the CPO and outside of the merger 
gives 
(𝑛 − 3)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2 + 𝑞3) = (𝑛 − 3)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − (𝑛 − 2) ∑ (𝑞𝑘𝑘>3 ).               (18) 
Summing equations (4-6) and (18) gives 
(𝑛 + 1 − 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2) ∑ 𝑞𝑘
𝑘
+ (1 − 𝛽2,1)𝑞1 + 𝛽1,2𝑞2 + 𝑞3 = (𝑛 − 𝛽2,1 − 𝛽1,2)(𝑎 − 𝑐) 







+ (𝑎 − ∑ 𝑞
𝑘
𝑘




)(𝑎 − 𝑐), 
where the second equality follows from equation (6). This gives 
∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑘 = (
𝑛−1−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2
𝑛−𝛽2,1−𝛽1,2
) (𝑎 − 𝑐).                                                  (19) 
Combining equations (1) and (19) gives 

















(1 − 𝛽1,2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2





(1 − 𝛽2,1)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
2
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Table 1. Partial Ownerships in major communication networks in 1996 before and 
after the merger of Time Warner and Turner. Source www.lesechos.fr 
Table 2. Example Cross Partial Ownerships in Germany and France. Source 
www.lesechos.fr 
Table 3. Equilibrium profits under different scenarios 




Figure 1: Schematic model of hostile takeovers within an industry with cross partial 
ownership. 
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Table 3. Equilibrium profits under different scenarios 
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Table 4. Model predictions compared to actual CPO values for Deutschland AG 
and noyaux-durs arrangements. 






Munich Re 0.2 6 Allianz 0.2 0.055 
Allianz 0.2 6 Munich Re 0.2 0.055 
Deutsche Bank 0.07 6 Allianz 0.05 0.055 
Allianz 0.05 6 Deutsche Bank 0.07 0.055 
Munich Re 0.023 6 Dresden Bank 0.083 0.055 
Dresden Bank 0.083 6 Munich Re 0.023 0.055 
UAP 0.1 10 BNP 0.1 0.019 
BNP 0.1 10 UAP 0.1 0.019 
ELF 0.04 10 Renault 0.015 0.019 
Renault 0.015 10 ELF 0.04 0.019 
ELF 0.02 10 BNP 0.01 0.019 
BNP 0.01 10 ELF 0.02 0.019 
 
